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Christian Lawyer Stories and
American Legal Ethics
By Thomas L. Shaffer*
I. INTRODUCTION
My view of legal ethics rests on, or at least involves, a couple of biases.
For one thing, I think of legal ethics as an ethical subject rather than as a
legal subject.1 When it comes to "professional responsibility" I am more
interested in morals than I am in law. In this (and in very little else), I
am in agreement with Dean Monroe Freedman, who said, in a lecture
dedicated to the memory of Pope John XXIII, that the question which
interests him is whether a good person can be a lawyer.2 For Freedman, I
think, and for me, the interesting question has to do with the goodness of
being a lawyer. But to say that is also to make the claim, which I do, that
moral questions can be talked about with the analytical rigor we lawyers
are thought to bring to legal questions. And to claim intellectual rigor for
legal ethics is to disapprove, as I did in an earlier discussion,3 of the way
people in law school usually go about dealing with moral questions.' I
have four positions to state at this point.
(1) Moral questions are relevant to the formation of lawyers, who, in
law school and beyond, are in fact being formed. I part company with the
law teacher of a colleague of mine who countered a student inquiry by
saying, "Ethics, shmethics! Ethics is for Episcopalians."
(2) The attempt to separate law and morals, in order to better study
law, is corrupting. I believe, with Robert E. Rodes, Jr.,6 that it is fatuous
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. University of Albuquerque (B.A.,
1958); University of Notre Dame (J.D., 1961). This article represents part of a book, in
progress, tentatively bearing the same title.
1. T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981).
2. Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 191
(1978).
3. T. SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 175-76.
4. Id.
5. R. RODES, THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE 32-35 (1976).
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to make this attempt even when the discussion is jurisprudential. Rodes
was looking substantively at the claims of American legal positivism.
When the discussion is about ethics, the attempt to separate law from
morals corrupts lawyers. To say, as the Harvard law professor of fable
did, "If you want to study justice you should go to divinity school," is
erroneous in substance and corrosive in moral effect. Part of the corrosion
is the exclusion of morals from the category of subjects which can be ex-
plicated, explored, analyzed, and evaluated in law school and in the or-
ganized legal profession.
(3) The attempt to isolate law from morals is one of the explanations
for the fact that lawyers say law school was and is an inhuman place,
that people there were not and are not treated well. The exclusion of
morals as an intellectually interesting subject does not mean that there is
no moral formation in law school; it means that there is bad moral forma-
tion in law school.7 Socrates told Thrasymachus that the two of them
could learn about justice from one another, by what they said to one an-
other and by the way they treated one another. Socrates was talking
about the virtue of justice.' When virtue is excluded from discussion, as it
is in the classical model of "Socratic" law teaching,9 the discussers learn
how to mistreat one another.
These three claims might have led me to argue that legal ethics should
be analyzed as law usually is, in terms of tentative and abstract state-
ments of principle. Legal ethics as a set of fraternal principles is the way
American lawyers learned to talk about the subject after the father ol
American legal ethics, David Hoffman, wrote his first "Essay on Profes-
sional Deportment" in 1817.10 Hoffman's efforts, most notably his "Fifty
Resolutions on Professional Deportment,""1 along with George Shar-
swood's 1854 essay on legal ethics,12 were later translated into official con-
sensus statements from bar associations, courts, and legislatures." ThE
codal form was followed by the American Bar Association in its 1908 Ca-
nons," its 1969 Code,"' and its 1980 proposed Rules."6 In all of thesE
6. See T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE at ch. 9 (1977)
7. Id. See also T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, supra note 1, at ch. 16.
8. I DIALOGUES OF PLATO 603 (B. Jowett trans. 1892).
9. T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, supra note 6, at ch. 8.
10. D. HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 324-34 (1817).
11. II D. HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-75 (2d ed. 1836).
12. Sharswood, An Essay on Professional Ethics (1854), 32 A.B.A. REP. - (1907).
13. The earliest example is Code of Ethics Adopted by the Alabama State Bar Associa
tion, 118 Ala. xxiii (1899) (drafted by Judge Thomas Goode Jones); see Armstrong, A Cen
tury of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A.J. 1063 (1978).
14. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
15. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1975).
16. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Tent. Draft 1980); se
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cases abstract moral principle is the form of ethical statement. This is as
true of the Rules as it was of the Canons or the Code, although the 1980
draft of the Rules stridently avoids such words as "moral," "ethical," or
"conscience." There are, of course, some statements of law in these docu-
ments;17 for example, certain behavior is made the subject of penal sanc-
tion. However, all three documents are devoted mostly to moral admoni-
tion, stated abstractly, as principle. This brings me to another claim.
(4) Moral principles are not an adequate way to state, to analyze, or
to study legal ethics. Not, at least, if we are to stay with the ques-
tions: Is it possible to be a good person and a lawyer? And, if so, how T 8
The most persistently useful textbook I have used in teaching legal eth-
ics is Harper Lee's novel To Kill a Mockingbird." I have learned through
my undeserved success to respect Miss Lee's lawyer, Atticus Finch, and
to wonder why he is such an effective teacher. It seems superficial, if not
impossible, to use moral principles as a way to analyze (a) Finch's being
defense counsel for Tom Robinson, the black client accused of rape; or
(b) his insistence on speaking the unspeakable truth in Robinson's trial."
It is possible, of course, to say that a lawyer has a responsibility to see to
it that every person accused of crime has the effective assistance of coun-
sel and that a lawyer must do the best job he can for his client, let the
chips fall where they may. Atticus Finch seems to have obeyed those
moral principles. The discussable issues could then include what "effec-
tive" means could be used in a situation in which the only way to have
saved the not guilty Robinson would have been to help him become a
fugitive; a fugitive, as they say, from justice. But, if analysis is going to
stay with the facts, we should admit that Finch did not understand the
case, the "issues," or the moral problem as effective assistance of counsel.
To state the case as turning on these principles is not the best way to
understand Atticus Finch. The way he saw the case has to do not so
much with his having been a lawyer alert to the moral principles of his
calling as with his having been a rural Southerner and a Christian gen-
tleman. This is not to say that Atticus Finch was unprincipled. To the
extent that he announces principles (for example: he cannot be one per-
son in town and another person at home; he cannot go to church and
worship God unless he helps Tom Robinson; he must tell the truth about
Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J.
953.
17. Patterson, A Preliminary Rationalization of the Law of Legal Ethics, 57 N.C.L.
REV. 519 (1979).
18. See T. SHAFFER, supra note 1, at ch. 16. See also FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 198.
19. H. LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960).
20. Id.; see H. FOOTE, SCREENPLAY OF To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1964); Shaffer, The
Moral Theology of Atticus Finch, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 181 (1981).
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Robinson and Mayella Ewell, in court; and it is a sin to kill a mocking-
bird), his principles are not bad principles, and are not, upon analysis,
illogical or irrational. Those principles do not, however, answer the ques-
tions we want to answer: (a) Can a good person be a lawyer? (b) If so,
how?
Finch's principles only make the question more difficult be-
cause: Atticus Finch's church (the white Baptist and Methodist congre-
gations in Maycomb) gave him no support in what he did; Atticus did not
help Tom Robinson when he did the things lawyers in court usually do to
help people; if any tactic could have helped Tom Robinson it probably
was not telling the truth; "Don't kill mockingbirds" is only another way
to say, "Do good and avoid evil." As a principle it says nothing. Yet,
Atticus Finch is a good person, and he is a lawyer, and he knows how to
be both at the Same time. He provides useful guidance on our questions,
but the statement and analysis of his principles is not the way to learn
from him.
II. CHARACTER
One thing you could say about Atticus is that he had character. The
creator of Atticus Finch said that the story was the story of "his view of
life," of his conscience.21 The fact that Atticus is a favorite among Ameri-
can readers and moviegoers says that we have learned from him about
character.22 There is a relationship between what a person is and what he
decides to do; we call that relationship character. 8 The advantage of ana-
lyzing Atticus in terms of character, rather than in terms of principles, is
that it begins to tell us a little about where he comes from, about his
motives, and about who he is. This is to say that his moral decisions (or,
even better, his seeing moral problems where he did see them) come from
who he is, and also help to determine who he is. In being the person he is,
Atticus is able to do what he does, and in doing what he does he forms
and reforms the person he is. We say that a good person has character,
but we do not mean to say only that he believes in discernible moral prin-
ciples and, pursuant to these principles, makes good decisions; we mean
also to say something about who he is and to relate who he is to his good
decisions. When discussion proceeds in this way, principles need not be
explicit. We can say, "How did Atticus see this situation?" or "What
would Atticus do?" rather than, "What principles apply?"
21. H. Lee, Foreword to H. FOOTE, SCREENPLAY OF To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD at v (1964).
22. See Literary Laurels for a Novice, LIFE, May 26, 1961, at 78A; First Novel: Mocking
Bird Call, NEWSWEEK, Jan 9, 1961, at 83.
23. S. HAUERWAS, CHARACTER AND THE CHRISTIAN LIFE: A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS
(1975).
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We arrive at a sense of who a person is when we learn'about his grief,
his joy, and his irrationality, more about him than about his decisions. An
example is Dolphus Raymond, the odd old fellow who sits outside the
courthouse in Maycomb and drinks from a bottle in a paper sack. He
appears to the town to be an old drunk, but he does not drink liquor; he
drinks Coca-Cola. And who does he let know what he is drinking? Not
the community, which thinks Dolphus is drinking moonshine; instead, he
tells three children who are learning to weep over what people in the
community do to one another in the name of the law. Adolphus is not an
old drunk; he is a tragic figure, a teacher, and a moral critic. Another
example in the story is Mrs. Dubose. When we know more about what
was going on with her, as Jem reads to her from Ivanhoe, we know more
about the meaning of caring for old people, and more about Atticus, and
more about the formation of a gentleman,'4 than we knew when our infor-
mation was that Jem had to read to her as punishment for wrecking her
camellias.
Yet, knowing character is not only a matter of knowing more about the
explanation for a person's acts. For example, why does Atticus take the
Robinson case? We think we know something about that, but it does not
come from knowing more about his act in taking the case. The narrator,
Scout, tells us almost nothing about that act.' 5 Atticus says a lot about
why he represents Robinson as he does, but nothing about why he agreed
to represent him in the first place. If there is a principle to explain it, it is
not a principle Atticus even mentions. Probably every reader will say by
the time he finishes the book, that it is, after all, the sort of thing Atticus
would do. It is like a mother who looks at her new baby and loves the
baby (James McClendon's example).' Does she decide to love the baby?
Is the most significant thing her act in loving the baby, or does it have
more to do with something which is not understood primarily as a matter
of acts? It is significant to know that she loves her baby, but what we
then know is not knowledge about a principle or a decision or an act.
Many morally significant facts are not decisions, or do not seem to be.
Atticus, for example, gets angry at white business people who take advan-
tage of black customers. He says, in his anger, that such people are trash.
But he does not seem to have decided to call them trash. Much of what
Atticus does is a matter less of decision, or of act, than of disposition.
24. The concept, or notion, of a "gentleman" is complex and various. I see a common
insight in discussion of it, but important distinctions in the discussions of it by Thomas
Jefferson, General Lee, Cardinal Newman, and Atticus's son Jem, who says "Atticus is a
gentleman, and so am I." Shaffer, supra note 20, at 222.
25. There is a brief scene in the screenplay which portrays Atticus's agreeing, reluc-
tantly, to take the case. H. FOOTE, supra note 20, at 22-23. This scene is not in the novel.
26. J. MCCLENDON, BIOGRAPHY AS THEOLOGY 21 (1974).
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One could use other words for this. Conviction, for instance, as McClen-
don uses the word,2" explains much of it. Some old-fashioned words for it
are virtue, or habit, or, if the disposition is evil, vice.2 Those words turn
on the particularity of a person, on who he is, and on how we come to
know about him. Those are character words, that is, words about traits of
character. They are stronger more telling words, than, say, the word opin-
ion. If I were to trust Atticus with a matter of great importance to me it
would be because I had some idea of what he would do on my behalf. It
would not be because of his opinions, or even because of the moral deci-
sions I could perceive him making, but it would be because he had
character.
Harper Lee does not begin To Kill a Mockingbird with a statement of
Atticus' principles and by the time she finishes telling us about Atticus
such a statement would be distracting. Instead, she acquaints us with the
character of Atticus Finch in an ordinary way.29 She tells us a story. We
come to know him as we came to know our parents, our aunts and uncles,
our playmates, and our favorite. teachers. We know his family; we know
the people he admires, "people with background," in Aunt Alexandra's
phrase, and other people, too; we know his neighbors, and we know him
as they know him; and we know his enemies. We know something about
his views on politics and religion, but, there, we know most of what we
know because we have known people who are like Atticus. We assume
that he is like them, or, better, because we do not think about the resem-
blance much at all, we feel that he is like them. We come to know about
Atticus in the way we learn most of what we learn about how to behave,
about morals, and that is more a matter of our heroes than it is a matter
of principles. As a result of knowing Atticus in the way Harper Lee
presents him I would be willing to trust him with something that is im-
portant to me, as Boo Radley and Tom Robinson trusted Atticus with
their lives.
III. STORIES
Often it is a poet, or playwright, or novelist, who understands best how
our morals work. He understands,, even better than we understand, how
we come to behave as we do. James Edwin Horton, the good judge of the
Scottsboro cases and a contemporary of Atticus Finch at the Alabama
27. Id. at 32-34.
28. S. HAUERWAS, VISION AND VIRTUE: ESSAYS IN CHRISTIAN ETHICAL REFLECTION (1974)
Hauerwas, A Tale of Two Stories: On Being a Christian and a Texan: A Theologicai
Entertainment, Summer 1981 PERKINS J. 1 (explores the significance of Southerner's judg-
ment that another person is "trash").
29. S. HAUERWAS, TRUTHFULNESS AND TRAGEDY 71-81 (1977).
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Bar, ruined his judicial career and brought homicidal wrath on whites and
blacks in Alabama when he set aside the verdict in the second Haywood
Patterson case in 1933.0 He did all of this to no effect; Patterson was put
to trial a third and a fourth time and in all other cases convicted. Judge
Horton suffered prolonged agony in presiding at Patterson's trial. The
consequences of his decision, for himself and for others, were conse-
quences of agony. The decision itself tells you nothing about Horton ex-
cept that he was unusual. When he was asked, some thirty-five years
later, why he acted as he did in those days, he said it was because he had
learned, at his mother's knee, the latixi maxim, fiat justitia ruat coelum.1
The principle, however the judge learned it, was undoubtedly applicable,
but the principle explains nothing to those of us who, in the 1980s, want
to learn from Judge Horton whether a good person can be a lawyer, and,
if so, how. To learn from Judge Horton about that we need to hear his
story.
I have come to suspect that a morality of principles is not good enough
for the study of legal ethics. Principles do not explain enough. Maybe we
who teach the subject have to find a way to study and to teach about the
ethics of character. One can learn about the ethics of character by study-
ing heroes in American lawyer stories, but there is an objection to that;
there is an objection, in fact, to the study of character in other ways, as
Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas studied character, for example.32 The objec-
tion in the literature of ethics has been that a morality of character is
subjective and relativistic and therefore not ethics at all. The study of
virtue and of virtuous lives smacks of "situation ethics, 33 which has come
to mean a system of ponderous justification for doing what you feel like
doing and, then, even when what you have done is pretty good, saying, "I
behaved as I did because of the way I was brought up." Ethics, the objec-
tion says, cannot be a study of single instances because single instances
from other lives do not give us guidance in our own lives.
If we believe that morality can be dealt with in the way we deal with
law in law school, the objection to the ethics of character will be that it is
not rational. Those -of us who claim that the interesting questions in legal
ethics are, "Is it possible to be a good person and a lawyer?" and, "If so,
how?" and who then claim that the way to answer the questions is to
30. T. SHAFFER, supra note 1, at ch. 14; D. CARTER, SCO'rrSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE
AMERICAN SOUTH (1969).
31. D. CARTER, supra note 30, at 273; Graves, Fiat Justitia Ruat Coelum, 94 THE NEW
REPUBLIC 218 (1938); T. SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 143-152. Fiat justitia ruat coelum can be
translated "let right be done though the heavens should fall."
32. S. HAUERWAS, supra note 23.
33. J. FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS (1966) gave this phrase to the language; see
Hauerwas, supra note 28, at 11-29.
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learn from lawyer-heroes, have to consider whether it is fair to charg,
that the ethics of character are subjective and irrational. To put the issui
positively: Can we justify a morality of character, and the study of law
yer-heroes as a way to study character, by showing those methods to be a
objective and as rational as a morality of principles is?
My fourth claim, then, is this: The truth about who we are, whic]
explains our morality, including such things as what our communities ari
and what our families have been, is, as in Atticus Finch's case, more
matter of character, of life as we live it, of story, than it is of principles
This is not a matter of saying whai is desirable, which is what I was doinj
when I extolled the ethics of character, but of saying instead that a stor
explains and displays principles and that one is close to the truth of one'
own moral life when he studies other lives by going to the sources o
morals in those lives. The life a person is living, the narrative into whic]
his life fits, or some terms such as these, explain how he even comes ti
see that a moral question exists. His seeing is prior to moral decision; hi
moral decision is prior to principle.8 '
One argument here is that our stories are the sources of our moral no
tions and that our moral notions are prior, in time and in logic, to ou
classifications and categories. Stories explain why we regard some of th
things we do as moral actions and regard other things we do as reflexes o
the products of routine. Our stories cause us to single out events and ca]
them moral events. We see some events as moral because we have more
notions about them. The notions bracket the moral issues and notion
become intelligible in stories. Stories explain notions, as notions explail
moral problems. Stories are prior to moral notions, as moral notions ar
prior to moral problems. To put that another way, a moral notion be
comes intelligible in a story. It is displayed and understood in a narrativ
context better than it is displayed and understood in a context of issue
and principles.
This can be illustrated by a true story. Sometime in the late 19th cen
tury a Chinese woman and her husband obtained the requisite papers ani
enough money to emigrate from China to the United States. The womaj
was pregnant and while she and her husband were on the high seas thei
baby was born. When they arrived in San Francisco an immigration ofli
cial noticed that the baby had no visa. He did not even have a passporl
The official wired to Washington to find out what he should do. The repl
from Washington was "Don't be a damned fool." One hears the story ani
cheers (I heard it from Rodes s5 and we both cheer) and yet there was n
34. S. HAUERWAS, supra note 28, at 30-47; J. MCCLENDON, supra note 26, at 20-22 (citin
and discussing Pincoffs, Quandary Ethics, Oct. 1975 MIND 552).
35. R. RODES, supra note 5, at 101. I have been helped in explaining this argument b
the perceptive criticism of James Wm. McClendon, Jr.
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principle to cover the case and the bureaucrat in Washington was not
about to draft one. He acted as he did because there was something about
him which was prior to his being an immigration official. That something,
in him and in ourselves, is what we cheer. Because the fellow in San
Francisco had lost his sense of the something-prior, he asked a dumb
question. One person saw a problem and the other did not; it was that,
not the answer to the problem, which distinguished them. It was the
dominance of I-am-a-bureaucrat, as a way of living (a life story), over a
more adequate story, that caused him to be a damned fool. (It happens to
lawyers, too.) Neither of the officials knew the answer to the problem;
neither of them had a useful principle at hand for it; only one of them,
though, was a damned fool.
In legal ethics, I have had to change my view of the student or lawyer
who gives his answer and explains it by saying, "I can't help it.-It's be-
cause I was raised in a Southern Baptist Church."" He is not being irra-
tional at all; he is simply pointing out a fact which is so potent, for both
of us, that it is prior to moral problems and moral principles. I have de-
cided that I have to understand that fact before I can even begin to figure
out how to use the problem and the answer to the problem in teaching. If
we do not understand that we run a risk even deeper than loss of a ra-
tional explanation for our morals. The risk we run is alienation from our-
selves; from who we are. And then we begin answering tough professional
questions by asking not "What should I do?" but "What does a lawyer
do?"'3 7 We begin, to use a story, to live out the difference between
Thomas More and Thomas Cromwell in Bolt's play "A Man for All Sea-
sons," by choosing to be Cromwell. 8 We practice our profession with a
disabling discontinuity between who we are and what we are doing. Too
many lawyers try to do that, and they end up in misery, or alcoholism, or
repentance. We who ponder legal ethics should not do anything to add to
their number.
This argument for the use of lawyer-hero stories is as ordinary, I think,
as the method Miss Lee used to tell us about Atticus Finch. The way we
grow up morally, and lots of other ways as well, is by listening to and
living out stories. We get our morality from the moral points in stories.
Some of these stories are very broad, grand things, "the Jewish experi-
ence," "the story of Jesus," "the voyage of America," and so forth. Such
stories have a lot to do with who we think we are and have everything to
do with our morals. Stories need not have principles but they do have
points. We often say, in this ordinary way, "The point of the story
36. T. SHAFFER, supra note 1, at ch. 16.
37. T. SHAFFER, supra note 1, at ch. 1-2.
38. R. BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (1962); T. SHAFFER, supra note 1, at ch. 18-19.
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is .... Stories, both the stories we live and those we hear, have plots
and characters. 9 We read or listen to or talk about a story and as we go
along we ask, "What happened next?" The point comes out of characters
creating and encountering the events of the story. Perhaps it is not a logi-
cal outcome, but it is an organic outcome and it makes sense. What was
logical about Atticus insisting that the jury hear what really happened
between Mayella Ewell and Tom Robinson? The point is not even neces-
sarily a consequence of the events; that kind of story would be boring; it
would be only a study in causation. What comes out of a good story is
what comes out of our own stories, out of life itself, a sense of who people
are, a sense, that is, of character.
The plot of a story, what connects events and gives them a point, is a
rational construct. It is an act of the mind, the act of the mind which
makes sense of the story. Authors and readers and critics make sense of
stories such as Atticus' story. (Another example is George V. Higgins'
Boston Street lawyer Jerry Kennedy.'0 A third is Ephraim Tutt of the
old Saturday Evening Post stories. 1) We make practical sense of our own
stories, and the stories of one another, when we attempt to live pur-
poseful lives. The intellectual (ethical) sense we make of a story is our
description of the character of the people in the story. We can be wrong
in doing that, and we can argue about it. It is subject to proof and reason
and, therefore, the ethics one has from stories are not only more concrete
than the ethics one has from principles, they are also rational. And more
than rational, making ethical sense of stories is an activity in which we
pile one story on top of another. In telling the story of Atticus, Scout tells
us her own story, and in talking about Scout's story about Atticus's story,
I tell you about my story, and in arguing with me about it you will tell me
about your story. We end up with a diversity of people, an array of vir-
tues and ideas, and a rich context for the study of the ethics of character.
This is not a contrivance, not merely a method; it is both how we go
about living our lives in a moral way and how we go about thinking. It is
even how we learn about our moral lives. We transfer the point of the
story, make it our own, and keep it from being a single instance.
Each of us has more than one story. The way we change our lives is by
39. S. HAUERWAS, supra note 28, at ch. 4; S. HAUERWAS, supra note 29, at ch. 4.
40. G. HIGGINS, KENNEDY FOR THE DEFENSE (1980); Osborne, Book Review, Book World,
THE WASHINGTON POST, March 2, 1980, at 14; Soler, Book Review, TIME, March 31, 1980, at
81. See also THE NEW YORKER, March 17, 1980, at 168; THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 3, 1980, at
38; THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW, March 2, 1980, at 8.
41. Scores of Ephraim Tutt stories were published between 1919 and 1944. They are
reviewed in A. TRAIN, YANKEE LAWYER, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF EPHRAIM TuTT (1943), and
several are reprinted in A. TRAIN, MR. Turr AT HIS BEST (H. Medina ed. 1961).
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testing one story against andther. 4' We change by asking if our stories are
adequate. The judgment that a story is not adequate is the result of com-
paring that story with a story that is adequate. Thus Louis D. Brandeis
goes along most of his life being a good lawyer and a social activist and
one day he discovers the fact that he is a Jew.43 He knew it all along, but
one day, well along in life, he discovered what he always knew. He discov-
ered that he was part of Israel, of the Jewish people, an international and
ancient and deeply significant story which was also his story. And the
story Brandeis had been living, the story of a lawyer, was tested against a
bolder, broader, and more adequate story. The comparison changed his
life.4 4 Similar crises of identify appear in innumerable stories of lawyers
who undergo Christian religious conversions. They test the story they are
living against the story they hear from the Gospels. They see themselves
in this new story and their lives are changed.
In To Kill a Mockingbird, Atticus is led right up to this comparison of
stories again and again. Sometimes he changes, as he did when he tested
the story of the old rural South against another, bolder, broader story
which was also his story.4 5 Sometimes he does not change, as when he
tests the story which tells him he cannot protect his battered, uncon-
scious, teen-aged son from the consequences of truth, against the story
which tells him he can lie, however, to save Boo Radley's seclusion. What
he says in these cases is a series of statements of principle: "I can't be
one man in town and another man at home;" "Can you understand?" he
says to Scout, and she says, "Yes, it would be like killing a mockingbird,
wouldn't it?" But, when we think about it, we know that these moments
were not primarily exhibitions of principle. People make moral judgments
in such moments of comparison, and we, when we read about such mo-
ments, make judgments about people and about ourselves. We can talk
about those judgments. We can be rational about them, and, what is more
important, rational about what causes us to make the judgments we
make. Stories help us make such judgments because the point of a story
is something we find for ourselves and apply in our own lives. The point
is found in one story and applied in another; it is transferable and objec-
tive, and therefore is a way to teach, learn about, ponder, and practice
42. S. HAUERWAS, supra, note 29 at 35, 73, 82-100; see Shaffer, 23 AM. J. JURis. 245
(1978).
43. A. VORSPAN, GIANTS OF JUSTICE 22-39 (1960).
44. The significance of Brandeis' Jewishness is not explored in discussions of his ethics,
see Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1965), which
means he is treated as morally disembodied; but it is not usual for writers to relate moral
theology and professional theology in law review discussions of legal ethics. Perhaps legal
ethics is also disembodied.
45. Which is to attempt for Atticus what was not attempted for Brandeis.
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legal ethics.
IV. THE STUDY OF AMERICAN, CHRISTIAN LAWYER-HEROES
The method involved here is, in a sense, though, immediate and simpli
and nonrational. The millions of people who like To Kill a Mockingbirc
are not analytical about their liking it; an interesting fact about the nove
is that there is not much reflective critical literature on it." Even thosf
responsible for choosing its author to get a Pulitzer Prize were probabl3
not analytical about their choice. The story of Atticus Finch appealed ix
an immediate way to many people and, one could say, because it appealec
to them, he is a hero. To be a hero is to have this quality of appealing t(
other people in the hero's family or church or town. If the hero appeals t(
enough people, he is hero to a nation (here, America or American law
yers). I do not think this immediate appeal is a sufficient way to accoun'
for heroes, but it is important; it is not to be dismissed merely because i.
is not altogether transparent. An important thing about hero stories ii
that they appeal from life to life. They appeal to us in the way influentia
people in our lives appeal to us, an appeal which is for the most par
unmediated by processes of analysis and comparison. One thing about al
American, Christian lawyer-hero story is that it appeals and influencei
those who hear it in this immediate way.
A story method in legal ethics begins with this fact. American lawyer
heroes are people who have this appeal, as a matter of fact, at first, rathe
than as a matter of analysis. What I am proposing as a method is at firs
a meditation on the lives of people who are already appealing in a morall.
influential, formative way. I am not proposing to defend the fact tha
they are appealing and morally influential. They just are. But becausi
they appeal and influence in a moral way I propose to call them heroes
It is another question, a question about ourselves, really, more tha
about our heroes, to ask why they have this influence. This is not t(
explain why the hero is selected for discussion so much as it is to asl
what about him causes me to suppose that many of my readers would joir
me in selecting him. The answer to that question, I think, is that the livel
of others are the smallest and most immediate way in which we studi
experience. They are, as James William McClendon says of biography,4
the smallest units in which experience can be reported. McClendon deal
with stories of real people; he dealt with history in a way that is differen
from the way one studies fictional heroes. I might admit that in som4
ways fiction is not quite as "small" a unit for study as biography is, sincl
46. See note 22 supra. My research assistants and I found only the two articles cited ii
note 22, neither of them written by a critic.
47. J. MCCLENDON, supra note 26.
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there are always two or more stories present in fiction. Jean Louise Finch
(Scout) tells her own story when she tells us about Atticus, and Harper
Lee tells her own story, her father's story," ' and the stories of both Jean
Louise and Atticus. One way to put this would be to say that the story of
the community is more prominent in fiction than it is in biography.4
9 If
that is so, it suggests an advantage one has in studying fiction rather than
biography-or, if not an advantage, at least an opportunity. The advan-
tage or opportunity is that it is easier to go from a fictional life to the life
of the community in which that life is lived than is the case with a bio-
graphical life. I hope to show that a fictional story proceeds from the
community more directly than a biography does.
It is probably useful to ask at somewhat more length what is involved
in the story of a hero. How is it that the story is, for its readers, the story
of a hero rather than the story of a villain or of the common, pathetic
"anti-hero" of modern fiction. Here are a number of possible theological
insights" into that question, insights I find in and borrow from
McClendon:5'
Compelling quality. Prior to explanation, and certainly prior to analy-
sis, we find the stories of saints and heroes compelling; we are struck by
them. We like them, and, more than liking them, we find in them some-
thing that keeps us from leaving them alone. That was certainly true of
the stories McClendon chose for his book, particularly so of Martin
Luther King, Jr.52 and Dag Hammarskjold. 5 People who heard about Dr.
King as he lived and worked in America were rarely indifferent to him. I
had associates in those days who idolized him and I had associates who
despised him; but I had no associates who could disregard him. He got
under our skins. He bothered people in a way that was out of proportion
to what people knew about him, knew as facts. This quality is also evi-
dent in the post-death commentaries on Dag Hammarskjold. The secular
humanists who hailed him as a reforming liberal were dismayed, after the
publication of Markings," to find out about his Christian faith, but they
48. H. LEE, supra note 21. Miss Lee, who is a lawyer, is the daughter of Amasa Lee of
the Monroeville, Alabama Bar, who began practicing law in 1915.
49. Shaffer, supra note 20, at 210-17.
50. My claim is that these are Christian theological points. I attempt them because I am
a Christian; if I seem to ignore parallels I should not ignore, particularly to Jewish theology,
the cause is ignorance rather than an insistence on exclusivity. I make Christian theological
claims about and for Atticus Finch because they seem to explain and follow from his life
and character.
51. J. MCCLENDON, supra note 26.
52. Id. at 65-86.
53. Id. at 39-64. See also HEROES AND HEROINES (A. Fraser ed. 1980); E. WRIGHT, HOLY
COMPANY: CHRISTIAN HEROES AND HEROINES (1980).
54. J. McCLENDON, supra note 26, at 40-44 (discussing D. HAMMARSKJOLD, MARKINGS (L.
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were not able, even when they wanted to, to dismiss him. They tried in-
stead to explain his faith away as a psychological aberration. A similar
explanatory process occurred with regard to Dr. King, as if the liberal
culture which supported Dr. King's politics could not believe that he was
a Baptist preacher and that it was important to him to be a Baptist
preacher. The culture learned that it had listened to a Baptist preacher,
and that it had to keep listening.
In lawyer fiction there is a popularity about the hero story, an immedi-
ate appeal, which cannot be dismissed, not even among those of us who
tend to avoid a story that makes the best-seller list or sells out at the box
office or gets imitated in a shabby television series. This compelling quali-
ty in the story moves around, often among popular audiences first but
ultimately even among those who resist fashion. That process is a familiar
one in the lives of the saints; Thomas More"5 and Francis of Assisi5 6 come
to mind. It is also familiar in the lives of contemporary religious leaders,
for example, Dr. King, Elie Wiesel, Pope John XXIII, and Dr. Billy
Graham.
Prodigiousness. The hero goes beyond himself. There is something ex-
traordinary about his effort. There is more in what he does than we would
see ourselves doing, not in what he succeeds at, but in what he does.5 7 It
is not necessary for heroes to be effective; the Christian lawyer-hero often
fails and is often in fact a martyr. Thomas More, a lawyer, is a better
example of this than Dr. King or Gandhi because More did not succeed at
all; he did not leave behind him some kind of ultimate triumph, as
Gandhi and King did. Atticus Finch spoke the unspeakable in the court-
room in Maycomb and he went to the street in front of the jail in the
middle of the night. These two acts are examples of this quality of
prodigiousness. One act failed and the other succeeded.
In the case of the fictional lawyer-hero this quality of prodigiousness
seems to become clearer when seen in the context of the ordinary. Atticus
is prodigious, he goes beyond himself, because Jean Louise describes his
points of beginning even more than she describes his moments of crisis.
We understand Atticus as a prodigious hero because we get to look at him
on Mrs. Dubose's front walk, with his two errant children in tow, as well
as on his feet in the courtroom. We see him (in the movie) calmly agree-
ing to be Tom Robinson's lawyer before we see him in front of the jail
Sjoberg & W. Auden trans. 1965)); Erling, Discipleship at the United Na-
tions: Hammarskjold's Religious Commitment, 98 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 902 (1981).
55. See note 38 supra.
56. Compare J. McClendon, supra note 26, at 190-92, 210.
57. T. SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 150-52, confronts three streams in the Christian tradi-
tion on the question of being effective, all of which have to take account of the fact that the
central symbol in the tradition is a gibbet.
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facing the lynch mob. The craftsman of fiction describes a resonance be-
tween ordinary life and extraordinary life as a part of making a character
more real; a good writer probably does this without intending to do it.5s
(Trollope's typical English gentleman, Plantagenet Palliser, is finally he-
roic as a matter of course.") The origin of the art, and the result of the
art in the story of the lawyer-hero, is a sense that the hero is in his com-
munity, in his family, his town, and his church. The story is about the
community as well as about the hero. His prodigiousness is exercised
against the backdrop of a society of people who are not prodigious but
who help to explain why the hero is prodigious. Arthur Train's Emphraim
Tutt is another example of this. Tutt said, "Let John Rockefeller deal in
wholesale charity. I'm a retailer." 60  It was easy to be a Christian in
Maycomb, Miss Maudie Atkinson said, because Maycomb had Atticus to
go for it."'
The Numinous. The hero is in touch with something special, something
awesome and fascinating, something that attracts us and repels us at the
same time. McClendon describes and relies on a moment in Dr. King's
public life when he was "seized" by a physical and psychological religious
experience which was extraordinary in the circumstances, but which was
also the sort of religious experience which those in the black church in
the South knew about and in some sense sought and could expect to have.
This quality of numinousness demands judgment, in a fictional lawyer
story, because it has a layer of interpretation (the author's) which biogra-
phy, and particularly biography which is historically careful, may lack. I
suppose judgment is present in all fictional stories because the author
wants to make it clear that some experiences are critical to the descrip-
tion of the character and some are necessary to move the story along.
Huckleberry Finn's struggle over whether to betray Jim is more signifi-
cant in this sense than his struggle with his father before he leaves home.
In the fictional lawyer story the extraordinary moment, the moment of
numinousness, tends to be a socially significant event-mostly, I suppose,
because the story is about a lawyer. Atticus' courtroom performance, and
his refusal to allow Sheriff Tate to lie about Jem, seem to me more numi-
nous than does his refusal to fire the black woman who raises his
58. For a somewhat similar notion of resonance in stories see C. SNOW, THE CONSCIENCE
OF THE RICH viii (1960).
59. A. TROLLOPE, THE DUKE'S CHILDREN (1880)(Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1973); C. SNOW,
TROLLOPE: His LIFE AND His ART 115, 146 (1975).
60. A. TRAIN, YANKEE LAWYER: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF EPHRAIM TuTT 441 (1943).
61. "Attorney" means one who goes to town. Maycomb had Atticus to go in this sym-
bolic sense, that is, Maycomb more than Tom Robinson, was on trial. Miss Maudie also
meant that Atticus was symbolically going to Calvary, which is what Christians do for one
another and for the world; Mark 8:34-35.
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children.
The lawyer-hero's actions are not only more public than the numinous
actions of other heros, but they also are more measured, more considered,
and more fully explained. For these reasons, taken with the fact that the
lawyer-hero's actions are more public, they invite judgment. Because they
are both more social'and more rational (or rationalized), they invite judg-
ment. They invite the reader's opinion on whether the action was good
for the community. It was in those terms that Atticus was criticized for
his defense of Tom Robinson; it was in those terms that he imagined him-
self under judgment for not lying to avoid Jem's pain and for lying to
save Boo Radley's seclusion.
Usefulness. The hero, and particularly the lawyer-hero in fiction, be-
comes a hero because his story fits the moral needs of the times. It is
fitting. It was no accident that a courageous small-town Alabama lawyer
was a hero to a culture absorbed in the early turmoil of the Civil Rights
Movement, or, a few years later, that television made a hero story out of
the experience of a brave Alabama circuit judge in a similar case.2 It is
no accident that Judge James Edwin Horton's story was that of a hero in
the Scottsboro cases thirty years after they occurred, when, to some ex-
tent, our country had come to its senses and the scars and tensions of the
Civil Rights Movement cried out for healing. In our pain we cried out for
stories about heroes for both sides to admire. Judge Horton, who acted in
1933, was a hero in Alabama in 1975, as much as he was a hero in New
York. He was a hero because both places needed such a hero at that time.
In 1934 Alabama turned him out of office and in 1933 New York con-
demned him as a bigot. In the case of a fictional lawyer-hero such as
Atticus, this quality of usefulness is also a result of the fact that the au-
thor understands the times, speaks to the times, or, more accurately,
speaks from the times. Harper Lee and Dan Carter were active adults in
the 1950s, writing about Alabama country lawyers of the 1930s. Both law-
yers were popular heroes in the 1950s; neither was a popular hero, neither
could have been, in the 1930s.
Intellectual quality. The hero, and particularly the Christian lawyer-
hero in American fiction, is a person of both bravery and insight. He un-
derstands what is going on (as Thomas More did, especially the Thomas
More of Robert Bolt's play, a fictional hero), and he acts in reference to
what is going on in a clear-sighted, skillful way. In a good lawyer story
none of these qualities is abstracted into pure goodness; the hero stum-
bles and his stumbling-his sin, even-proves that it is hard to be brave
and clear-sighted. But bravery and insight are more prominent in his life
than in the lives of those around him. They show up when he is compared
62. Judge Horton and the Scottsboro Boys, April 22, 1975; notes 30 and 31, supra.
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with others, as More, in the play, shows the same insight as Cromwell and
Cardinal Wolsey, but more hope and bravery; the same bravery as the
Duke of Norfolk, but more insight.6 3 The lawyer hero evinces courage by
speaking out; this is partly because an American lawyer is expected to be
a thinker, but also because he acts in the community, often against the
community, but always in such a way as to reform the community with-
out destroying it.
V. CHARACTER IN COMMUNITY
All of these qualities: being compelling, being prodigious, being in
touch with the numinous, being useful, and being a thinker, are acts of
character in community. McClendon argues" that this social office, char-
acter in community, is an essential one in the use of biography as theol-
ogy, and I think he is right, but my claim is an easier one since I am
dealing only with Christian lawyer-heroes in American fiction. Lawyers
inevitably act in the community. Fictional heroes are what they are be-
cause their creators put them in communities. The connection between
character and community is clearer in the sort of story I talk about be-
cause the connection between character and community is explained
more elaborately. The lawyer is explained as a person who talks (witness
Faulkner's Gavin Stevens65 ); he talks about the community, about the
community's story and thus his own story is already partially interpreted
by himself. He becomes a hero because he stands before a background
which his own talk helps preserve. (Witness Gavin Stevens explaining
rural Southern custom to his nephew, and as he explains, he exhibits his
sorrow at some of the custom he explains.)6 6
A. American Lawyer-Heroes in Family, Town, and Church
The story of a saint or of a hero is the story of character in community.
This is true because, at the very least, the story of a saint or hero is a
fitting story. It would not be understood in categories either of sanctity or
of heroism unless it was useful to people who live in similar situations.
The fact that the story is familiar is what makes it useful. There are also
two more profound reasons why the story of the hero is the story of char-
63. See note 38 supra.
64. J. MCCLENDON, supra note 26, at 188-203.
65. Shaffer, supra note 20, at 188-204; D. Montgomery, The Achievement of Gavin
Stevens (1970)(unpublished doctoral dissertation in the University of South Carolina
Library).
66. D. Montgomery, supra note 65.
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acter in community. One of these is the fact that the hero did not act
alone; he was not heroic without spiritual support. Another reason is that
the way we know what we believe is through the stories of saints and
heroes. Not only do we learn what to do from our heroes; we also learn
from them what to believe. Gavin Stevens taught his nephew both what
to do and what to believe. People are canonized and have tales told about
them because we need their stories to live and to learn by.
Family. There are three elements of the American community whose
story is told as its Christian lawyer hero's story is told: family, church,
and town. First, the hero comes from a family; one of the ways we know
him is by knowing his family. An example here is the Wall Street lawyer
Henry Knox in Louis Auchincloss' novel The Great World and Timothy
Colt."' Henry Knox's Yankee Protestant clerical forebears are important
to knowing him; so are his stalwart wife, his giddy daughters, and his on-
the-make son-in-law. Atticus Finch would not be who he is if it were not
for his sturdy Methodist ancestors and the other "people of background"
from whom he came. But for Atticus' familial definition of his son Jem as
a gentleman-to-be, Atticus would not have come to make the distinction
he did between his son's immediate welfare (and Jem's destiny, too) and
the immediate welfare of Boo Radley. By contrast, Kafka's character in
The Trial cannot be a hero because we do not know who he is. His story
is useful, but he is more a subject at the mercy of psychologically familiar
forces than he is a person. The most ordinary way for us to learn who
"K" is would be to learn about his family. Kafka's art makes "K" anony-
mous by hiding "K's" family.
Church.6 8 An American lawyer-hero also comes from a church. In
many American hero stories church membership is important not only in
identifying, and identifying with the hero, it is also important in explain-
ing why the hero acts as he does. The hero would not have acted with
courage if he had lacked a sustaining spiritual community. The church
not only inspired the hero to act, often beyond anything the church itself,
as a human institution in a time and place, could approve of or even un-
derstand, but also gave him a way to nurse his frustrations and failures
without being destroyed by them. This was true of Henry Knox, who
probably was able to stay in his law firm and be a spiritual leader there
because his work for a seminary and for his church made up for the la%
firm's failure to satisfy his spirit. This is true in an almost ethnic way foi
67. L. AUCHINCLOSS, THE GREAT WORLD AND TIMOTHY COLT (1956); Shaffer, Henry Kno
and the Moral Theology of Law Firms, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1981).
68. I mean a sustaining and in some sense transcedent community; for most Americar
Christians this is the church. There is a parallel Jewish religious community for which "syn.
agogue" is hardly adequate; Wiesel, Recalling Swallowed Up Worlds, 98 CHRISTIAN CENTUR)
609 (1981); see note 50 supra.
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Higgins' Jerry Kennedy, the pragmatic but stubbornly Catholic criminal
lawyer in Kennedy for the Defense."9 It is true of Atticus, who said he
could not go to church and pray unless he both helped Tom Robinson
and told the truth about him. Atticus's heroism went beyond what
Maycomb's institutional white church could defend, but Atticus was act-
ing as martyrs often have-for example, More or Franz Jaggerstatter. 0
Atticus was sustained by the church even as he bore witness against it. It
is likely, as Donald Shriver and Karl Ostrom argue and demonstrate, that
altruistic action depends on support by a spritiual community as much as
the spiritual community depends on altruism.7
Not all American lawyer-heroes belong to churches. Many of the mod-
ern ones resist and condemn churches. But those who live outside the
church have a community for spiritual support, a place to go from and a
place to return to so that they can learn how to survive their frustrations.
The crusaders of adventure fiction make the point. Travis McGee"' has
his small cohort of dependable and honorable supporters. They sustain
him even when they have no other role in the story. Lew Archer,7 3 whose
crusades against evil are usually lonely crusades, never goes through a
story without finding people of character who understand him. Camus's
Dr. Rieux 74 had someone to talk with. Bolt's More" has, even at the end
of the play, the sustaining memory of the church which taught him about
hope and martyrdom and would have continued to sustain him if it had
understood what was going on. Franz Jagerstatter read the lives of the
saints and declined the advice of his bishop. 76 Gavin Stevens goes out
from and returns to his relationship with his sister and with the sewing-
machine salesman, V.K. Ratliff.
Town. Finally, the American and Christian lawyer-hero has a town, a
society which sees his witness, which hears it as Israel heard the prophets,
and which thereby fulfills its function in his life and in its own, even
when it resists him and destroys him. Atticus and Gavin argued to the
town, in league with the town, when they made the standard country law-
yer's appeal against social engineers of the North. Theirs was not a disin-
69. G. HIGGINS, supra note 40.
70. T. SHAFFER, supra note 1, at ch. 20; G. ZAHN, IN SOLITARY WITNESS: THE LIFE AND
DEATH OF FRANZ JAGERSTATTER (1964).
71. D. SHRIVER & K. OSTROM, Is THERE HOPE FOR THE CITY? (1977); discussed in T.
SHAFFER, supra note 1, at ch. 2.
72. John D. MacDonald's beach-bum adventure hero; see, e.g., J. MACDONALD, ONE
FEARFUL YELLOW EYE (1966).
73. Ross MacDonald's down-at-the-heels Los Angeles public detective; see, e.g., R. MAC-
DONALD, BLACK MONEY (1965).
74. A. CAMUS, THE PLAGUE (1948).
75. R. BOLT, supra note 38.
76. See note 70 supra.
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genuous appeal; if it was the product of prejudice, and it was not entirely
so, it was not a prejudice they had to pretend to have. The judges and bar
association officials at Henry Knox's funeral knew that he had been im-
portant to them and that he had known about their importance to him.
The importance of town as distinguished from family is that the town
accounts for the hero as a social person, and therefore is, as we readers
are, an audience for his heroic action. It may be that a tree falling in the
forest makes no noise but a hero cannot fall in the forest; he is not a hero
unless the town is there to see him fall. The town is distinguished from
the church because it is not necessarily, or even usually, a source of spiri-
tual sustenance to the hero. It may be no more than his foil but it must
always be his backdrop and his audience. The point about the town is the
point Karl Barth made about a Christian theology to explain biblical
Israel: Israel is there to hear the prophets; it need not heed what it
hears.77
B. A Lawyer's Moral Theology
The methodological question which is consequent to this claim of the
hero as character in community is this: Is it legitimate, having identified
the community in this way (as family, church, and town), to infer reli-
gious significance from what one finds in the community? Is it legitimate
to look to the community for the hero's point of view? Atticus Finch says
very little about his faith. I have been told that such a Christian lawyer-
hero from the South would not have said much about his faith. Atticus
says enough to let us know that he takes his faith seriously but the rest of
what we know about his faith, if we know anything, comes from knowing
about his town, his family, and his church. The need I have in trying to
get moral theology from the story is the need to account for the intellec-
tual side of his courage; to explain his point of view when he himself said
very little about it.78 I do not have a diary (as McClendon had on Ham-
marskjold). Atticus, Gaven Stevens, and Henry Knox' wrote neither
books nor spiritual music. (McClendon had those on Clarence Jordan and
Charles Ives.7 9) I infer Atticus' and Knox's Christianity from their com-
munities and I look at their faith (thus inferred) and their actions and
test these against the facts and the intuitions which go into my under-
standing of how they were courageous. And from all of this I claim them
as heroes for American lawyers. I even claim that, with the products of
this inference and intuition, I can account for ethical principles in terms
of where they come from, as both thematic (that is, theological) and his-
77. II K. BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS 195-205 (T. & T. Clark ed. 1957).
78. Shaffer, supra note 20, at 204-10.
79. J. MCCLENDON, supra note 26, at chs. V, VI.
[Vol. 33
CHRISTIAN LAWYER STUDIES
torical sources. I have claimed that lives are prior to principles. I do not
appeal here to logic: A hero story speaks to its reader directly, from life
to life, without the mediation of concept or of explanation. Atticus speaks
to us modern lawyers, and speaks as well to families, churches, and towns.
We read and are formed by the stories of heroes in a way that is
analagous to the way we are formed by the lives of people in our families,
our churches, and our towns. But I do have an argument for inferring
faith from community.
This method is not so much a matter of identifying belief, of claiming
that Atticus and Henry Knox had belief, as it is a matter of locating a
rational center that can explain their actions more plausibly than other
explanations would. How is it that Atticus is willing to sacrifice himself as
he does? Is it because he believes in the rule of law, or the Bill of Rights,
or the Civil Rights Movement? The question is not how would I explain
his actions if he were Horatius at the bridge of Odysseus in Troy, but how
do I explain this Atticus, of Maycomb, Alabama, U.S.A., in 1935? What is
the rational center of his actions? And I mean here to include the real
moral spectrum of his actions, his regrets for his wrong actions, those he
regrets and those he would regret if he were morally consistent," as well
as his acts of clear heroism. His mistakes and his stumbles, his sins and
his grief, are necessary to understanding his heroism. Without mistakes
and stumbles he would be a bore and his story would be only hagio-
graphic. My argument is that Christian faith, the images and metaphors
of the Cross, the Suffering Servant, and atonement, seem to work better
than any other explanation. And I find those images in the stories of old
small towns in Alabama, of Baptist and Methodist Churches in the (white
and black) South, and of the Finch family as Scout describes it and as I
and other America readers of her story know about such families.
If this method is legitimate, it is a theological method. My argument
in this respect is like Hauerwas'81 and McClendon's 82 and I will state it
quickly and for present purposes: A doctrine of atonement, of the recon-
ciliation of people with God and with one another, and especially Atticus'
story, of black people with white people, is both subjective theology and
objective theology. The Christian tradition says that people are reconciled
at the Cross, that their friendship with God is a gift which makes it possi-
ble for them to be friends with one another, to see and accept one another
as gifts, and for which the only appropriate response is gratitude. To this
extent, Christianity says, reconciliation is an objective fact, and the theol-
ogy of atonement (at-one-ment with God and neighbor) is a theology of
80. Shaffer, supra note 20, at 197 n.32; Shaffer, supra note 67, at 370-75, attempts a
similar point in reference to Auchincloss's Henry Knox.
81. S. HAUERWAS, supra note 29.
82. J. MCCLENDON, supra note 26.
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objective, historical, and accomplished fact. That is true, according to the
Christian tradition, but it is not all that is true. The tradition also says
that the believer shares in God's work in the world; part of the gift he is
given at the Cross is a share in the Cross, the invitation to be an agent in
the atonement, the call to move the stone from in front of Lazarus'
grave. 83 This is a theology of the subjective. Thus atonement is both ob-
jective and subjective. Redemption is not merely an historical event, but
also an event that goes on, is going on, and will go on.84 It goes on in the
lives of those around us and prototypically in the lives of Christian he-
roes. Christian heroes provide to the people of God, to the church which
hears and believes, and to the town which only hears solid, rational infor-
mation about who God is and what He is doing in the world. They pro-
vide what McClendon calls "concrete theological gain,"8 5 and-.therefore
participate in the purpose of Christian theology, which is to inform the
people of God.
VI. THE THEOLOGY OF THE LAWYER-HERO
This method does result in what one might call second-stage concepts.
It may be true, as some philosophers and theologians argue,86 that all
concepts are removed from reality-that they freeze reality and put into
words what people experience primarily without words, that concepts al-
ways "smell of the lamp," especially in academic discussions of morals. It
is not necessary for an aging law professor, who is out merely to get a
firmer handle on legal ethics, to get into that quarrel. It is necessary,
though, to say more about the method I borrow from Hauerwa 8 7 and
McClendon, specifically in reference to my claim that this method is
theology.
McClendon argues from the moral lives of those whose biographies he
has studied that the theology of a life involves image and event, and that
these are prior to the principles and propositions. He defines religion as
the application of the images of faith to one's own life. (He uses "relig-
ion" in this definition, which is a bit troublesome because some modern
theologians, following Karl Barth,88 say that Christianity is not a religion;
they see religion, as I think Thomas Aquinas did, as a natural virtue, as
man's reaching up to God, whereas Christianity is a matter of God's
reaching down to man. McClendon uses the word in a man-in-the-street
83. I am indebted for this image of what stewardship means to Rev. Lynn R. Buzzard.
84. J. MCCLENDON, supra note 26, at 176-79.
85. Id. at 87-111.
86. Id.
87. See note 28 supra.
88. K. BARTH, THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS (1919, first English ed. 1933).
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sense.) This application is a manifestation and a use of the grand, endur-
ing images of faith, the great metaphors, which the person of faith (the
Christian lawyer-hero, for instance) has grown up seeing applied in proto-
typical ways. These images and metaphors carry for him, and for his
community, the content of the faith. All of this is, among other things, a
way to describe that force which guides our moral action but which is not
a matter of facts. It is what a person means when he says, "I do it be-
cause that's the way I was brought up."
Possibly, someone, someday, early in the life of the white community in
Southwestern Virginia, looked at the ungainly mountain I see from my
front porch and said that the mountain was a house; he called it "House
Mountain." The community accepted the name, accepted his saying that
about the mountain. The Indians who were here before black and white
people came would not have called the mountain a house because their
homes were not like that mountain, or, better, because a house which
looked like that did not mean anything to them and could not have been
the namesake of a mountain. Perhaps a Spanish explorer in Colorado
looked at the curious way the snow endured in the summer in a high
altitude canyon and said that the mountain and canyon made a Holy
Cross; the name came from his community as much as the name of house
came from the Virginian's community. And, so, in other and more curious
ways the red-rock formations west of Colorado Springs are called kissing
camels and, in an example McClendon borrows from John Wisdom, a wo-
man's new hat is called the Taj Mahal. This is the stuff of poetry. It is
strong stuff and it is community stuff. The difference between such meta-
phors and similes ("the mountain looks like a house") is the difference
between poetry and prose. McClendon's point is that such image and
metaphor is also theological stuff. For example, McClendon is persuasive
in saying that "hoc est enim corpus meum"-"this is my body"-is a sim-
ilar event and image. The Cross, the nation Israel, the Suffering Servant,
the atonement, are, of course, facts. But they are also metaphors and
images.
However, images as powerful as these biblical images do things moun-
tains and hats do not do. They cut across cultures, for one thing, as the
naming of mountains does not. The images Jesus used were already
strong among the Jews who heard him. They became strong to the
Greeks and Romans who heard St. Paul and to the Africans and the An-
glo-Saxons who heard the two St. Augustines.
The great Christian images also unify. McClendon talks about Dr.
King's living out the metaphor of atonement, atonement as estrangement
and as sacrifice, but also atonement as reconciliation. Dr. King sought
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the reconciliation of his oppressors." McClendon talks also of the powe
the Cross had in Hammarskjold's life-suffering servanthood as the wa
to understand "the meaningfulness of death and the meaninglessness c
killing."90
Images are not neutral. There are true images, and false images, ani
stressful images. The hero's living out and living under one set of image
rather than another is choice (and more than choice, really, since image
speak of and speak to convictions and a commitment which does no
merely rise out of a moral quandary or series of moral quandaries). Th
powerful racist images of Nazi Germany, and those which lurked in th
Maycomb of Atticus Finch's generation, proved to be false images. Believ
ers claim that the images and metaphors of Cross, Israel, and Exodus ar
true images. Much of what makes Atticus, Judge James Edwin Hortor
and Dr. King heroic lies in their living one set of images rather than th
other, and in their living within communities which lived both. We cele
brate in their lives a heroic quality which came from and supported th
choices these heroes made between, for example, images of wholeness an4
images merely of dominance.9 1 I think, too, that one can identify stress ii
the lives of these heroes, stress which evidences the enduring influence o
them of images which were not images of wholeness. This stress is what
identify in Atticus as the enduring influence of the Southern Christiai
Gentleman. I think the same thing was tugging on Judge Horton, whc
asked late in his life to explain the heroism he exhibited in the Scottsboro
cases, attributed his action to a latin maxim.92 That maxim is in our law
motto for the wise but imperious judge."
The community looks at such lives, and understands such images an(
metaphors, both as an explanation for its interest in these heroes and a
an explanation for their being first heroic and then interesting. The com
munity asks "What sort of people are these?" and finds them familiar bu
also challenging; it finds in them both understanding and rebuke. In reli
gious terms (using the word religion as McClendon uses it) these heroes
living their images, give current, relevant, even unavoidable meaning t(
traditional doctrine-and not only meaning but force as well. They re
vive the faith because.they make current sense of the religious image!
which carry the faith. There is depth in Miss Maudie's saying that At
ticus represents the Christians in Maycomb when he goes to the court
house. He moves Maycomb, white Maycomb, and does this in terms o.
inherited religious commitments. He represents white Maycomb as h4
89. T. SHAFFER, supra note 1, at ch. 10; J. MCCLENDON, supra note 26, at ch. III.
90. J. MCCLENDON, supra note 26, at ch. II; see note 54 supra.
91. Id.
92. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
93. See note 30 supra.
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joins Maycomb's black Christians at the courthouse, as he stands with
them, white and black together, under the Cross. Atticus seems to insist
that the religious commitments of the church be lived as well as believed,
and in this he resembles what Dr. King said, in the black church, before
the black South, that "free at last" includes the liberation of white police
officers.94 Atticus also does what Clarence Jordan did when Dr. Jordan
took the everyday, crossroads theology of atonement, which the South
had heard from Baptist preachers, and formed with this theology his
Koinonia community in Georgia.0 5 He formed a suffering, Acts-of-the-
Apostles, reconciling, black and white community to live out this theol-
ogy, a community which by suffering and reconciliation claimed its re-
demption in the Blood of the Lamb."
94. See note 89 supra.
95. J. MCCLENDON, supra note 26, at ch. V.'
96. I am grateful for the assistance and suggestions of William S. Geimer, Stanley
Hauerwas, William James McClendon, Jr., Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Brian C. Shaffer, Nancy J.
Shaffer, and Mary M. Shaffer.
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